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Abstract
A statistical estimation algorithm of the weight distribution of a lin-
ear code is shown, based on using its generator matrix as a compression
function on random bit strings.
1 Introduction
We considered in [13] the use of linear code generator matrices as conditioning
functions for the output of a random number generator, and showed how the
weight distribution of the code determines the distribution of the resulting ran-
dom variable. Weight distributions are not readily available for many codes; we
therefore here consider using random output of a specified quality to estimate
the weight distribution, leading to Algorithm 1.
We note from the outset that our solution to the problem of computing
the full weight distribution is inefficient, potentially costing more than simply
enumerating every weight by brute force. We describe it for the sake of curiosity
as an unusual approach; although it can be extended to non-binary codes, the
inefficiency of the algorithm prompts us to consider here the binary case only.
Estimates of the weight distribution of linear codes have mostly been de-
terministic algorithms, for instance based on linear programming [4, 10], or
approximate analytic bounds [11, 5]. While it is inefficient, Algorithm 1 is
applicable to any linear code with known generator matrix. In contrast with
a deterministic enumeration, it also allows one to make a statistical inference
about the whole distribution based on a sample.
There exist probabilistic algorithms for the determination of the minimum
weight, generally referred to as information set decoding (ISD). We mostly follow
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the summary in [1] and [8], where [6] is identified as the first example, [7] as an
improvement, and [12] as a somewhat different approach but with the previously
best results. These algorithms attempt to solve a rather different problem, but
they involve the use of randomness and the syndrome decoding procedure is
somewhat reminiscent of our algorithm, so we summarise them and show the
common ground in Section 5.
2 Algorithm derivation
We begin by assuming to have access to a random bit generator (RBG) out-
putting a stream of independent Bernoulli random variables B with fixed and
known probability of success. Let the balance of B be defined as
β = P(B = 0)− P(B = 1)
= 1− 2E[B] ,
with the so-called bias of B being ε/2 = |β|/2.
Let X be a vector of n random bits output by the RBG, and G the generator
matrix of a binary [n, k, d] linear code C. We showed in [13] how to compute
the probability mass function of Y = GX, assuming the weight distribution of
C is known. The weight distribution is the sequence
Al = # { c ∈ C | w(c) = l } (1)
where w(c) is the Hamming weight of a codeword c ∈ (F2)n.
The vector Y ∈ (F2)k is a random variable with probability mass function
µY ∈ R2k ,
µY (j) = P(Y = j) ,
where in writing j and j we use the binary representation of integers as vectors
a ∈ Z2k
a =
aj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ a =
k−1∑
j=0
aj2
j
 ∈ (F2)k .
The characteristic function of a random variable Y with mass function µY
is its inverse Fourier transform, which in the binary case is the Hadamard or
Walsh transform:
χY = HµY
We can summarise our main reasoning as follows: in Propositions 1, 2, we
show how the weight distribution of C determines the distribution of Y . If
the full weight distribution Al of the corresponding code C is not known, but
its generator matrix G is given, we can apply the compression function to a
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stream of independent bits of specified balance and then estimate Al from the
characteristic function of the compressed stream Y , as described in Algorithm
1.
Proposition 1. The b-th row of HµY corresponds to the c-th row of HµX ,
selected by the code word cT = bTG
Proof. The b-th row of the transform can be written as an expected value in
terms of the b-th Walsh function
χY (b) = E [hb(Y )]
= E
[
(−1)b·Y ]
= E
[
(−1)b·GX]
= E
[
(−1)c·X]
= E [hc(X)]
Proposition 2. If the individual bits of X are i.i.d. with balance β, the c-th
row of HµX equals the characteristic function of a linear combination of w(c)
bits, with w(c) the Hamming weight of c; hence, the c-th row of HµX is equal
to βw(c), and
χY (b) = β
w(c) . (2)
Proof. On the assumption that each X(j) is i.i.d. with balance β,
χY (b) = E
[
(−1)c·X]
= E
[
(−1)
∑w(c)−1
i=0 X(i)
]
The random variable Sn =
∑n−1
i=0 X(i) has characteristic χSn = [1, β
n]T ; hence,
χY (b) = E
[
(−1)Sw(c)]
= (−1)0µSw(c)(0) + (−1)1µSw(c)(1)
= βw(c)
Note that the zeroth word will always lead to χX(0) = 1, which we can safely
ignore by considering the variable χ∗Y = χY −χU , since the uniform distribution
over whatever space Y is defined will always have all other entries equal to 0.
Assuming no special ordering of the words can be found, we can treat χ∗Y as a
random variable to be sampled. The resulting algorithm is as follows:
Algorithm 1 (Binary linear code weight distribution estimation). Given a
binary linear code generator matrix G and a random number generator producing
independent output bits with a known, fixed balance β:
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1. generate N vectors x = {xi }ni=1, each of n independent random bits;
2. compute y = Gx for all x; each y is a sample of a random variable Y ;
3. estimate the mass function of Y using the N resulting samples;
4. to recover the exponents estimating the weights w(c), from Eq. (2) compute
lˆ(b) = logε |χ∗Y (b)| ;
5. round lˆ(b) to the nearest integer, int(lˆ(b));
6. estimate the weight distribution as
Aˆl = # { i ∈ int(lˆ) | i = l } .
The above is of course specific to binary codes in the use of ε = |β|.
3 Convergence
Each χY (b) should converge to β
w(c) in expectation, from Proof 2. We would
like to have an estimate of the speed of this convergence as a function of sample
size s and β. We remark that if we could sample the random variable χY (b)
directly, the variance would decrease with more strongly unbalanced input:
Var
(
(−1)b·Y ) = E [((−1)b·Y )2]− (βw(c))2
= 1− β2w(c)
Therefore, taking more strongly unbalanced random input, that is β ≈ ±1
but not actually equal to ±1, should lead to a a finite sample having a tighter
spread around the mean value. At the same time, a larger β increases the spread
between powers of β, and hence improves the distinguishability of each χY (b).
In practice, Algorithm 1 samples the probability mass function of Y by
taking s random samples xs from X and computing the sample mean
mY (b) =
1
s
s−1∑
j=0
1Gxj=b
with the indicator function 1A = 1 if event A is true, and 0 otherwise. Note
that
P(GX = b) = P
n−1⊕
j=0
γjX(j) = b
 (3)
where γj is the jth column of G, and we have been somewhat cavalier with
notation in using multiplication between γj ∈ (F2)k and random X(j) ∈ F2
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to indicate that either γj or the zero element of (F2)k will appear in the sum,
without defining this more precisely. Our aim is to highlight that there is in
general more than one X that will result in the same b, and since each may
well have a different Hamming weight, it will have a different probability of
occurring as a function of β. It is therefore not obvious whether it is possible
to quantify each µY (j) individually as a function of β, which makes it difficult
to draw conclusions about the speed of convergence as a function of β.
For a given β, we can at least say that Algorithm 1 does converge in expec-
tation, as follows. Let Ma be a Bernoulli random variable with probability of
success µY (a):
µMa = [1− µY (a), µY (a)]T
and let N(s, p) be a random variable with binomial distribution over s trials
with probability of success p. Then the distance between the true value and the
sample mean estimator is
µY (a)−mY (a) = 1
s
s−1∑
j=0
Ma
=
1
s
N(s, µY (a))
E [µY (a)−mY (a)] = 0
Var(µY (a)−mY (a)) = µY (a)(1− µY (a))
Each estimator is therefore the difference of two sums of binomial estimators:
χY (b)− χˆY (b) =
2k−1∑
j=0
hb(j) (µY (j)−mY (j))
=
 ∑
hb(j)=1
µY (j)−mY (j)
−
 ∑
hb(j)=−1
µY (j)−mY (j)

Each µY (j)−mY (j) having mean 0 simplifies this to the sum over 2k binomials
with a different variance, which remains unaffected by the subtraction.
Var(χY (b)− χˆY (b)) = 1
s2
Var
2k−1∑
j=0
N(s, µY (j))

Each µY (j) being in principle different, we cannot say the resulting sum of
binomials will be itself binomial.
4 Numerical results
Algorithm 1 clearly compares unfavourably to the deterministic, brute-force
solution: given G, one can simply compute every single word of the code by cy-
cling through all 2k possible messages y and performing a matrix multiplication
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Figure 1: χ∗(j) as a function of the P(1) of each of the i.i.d. bits of the RBG,
compared with all possible powers of β. These results were obtained using
a number of random samples s = 2k+4 (left) and s = 2k (right), the latter
being the required number for a worst-case deterministic algorithm based on
computing every codeword exhaustively.
yTG for each of them. This yields the full list of codewords, from which the
weight distribution Al may be immediately deduced. By contrast, as described
in Section 3 we need to estimate the probability of each y occurring by repeated
sampling, which will take some number of samples s per message, depending
on the required accuracy, meaning s · 2k multiplications Gx. We can see an
example of this in Figure 1, showing χˆ after applying the generator matrix of a
BCH(7,4,3) code as a compression function on several random bit streams gen-
erated with fixed but different β, and two separate values of s. For reference,
the known weight distribution of this code is Al = [1, 0, 0, 7, 7, 0, 0, 1].
Since the estimators lˆ are powers of β, a small β leads to a smaller separation
between estimators and hence a poorer overall estimate, for the same sample
size (see Figure 1). Similarly, we expect that for β ≈ 1 the estimators will tend
to cluster around the same value, with decreasing variance as seen in Section 3.
To provide a less unrealistic example we also considered the generator matrix of
the BCH(33, 13, 5) code with increasing sample size. Without loss of generality
we take a number of samples s = 2k−g, with g a measure of trade-off between
accuracy of the estimate and brute-force equivalence at g = 0. Results are
shown in Figure 2; we show a comparison of the estimated weight distribution
Aˆl by way of example, and a the distance between the estimated and real weight
distribution by comparing the normalized distributions in a total variation sense:
Wl =
Al
2k
TV D(Wl, Wˆl) =
1
2
k−1∑
j=0
|Wl(j)− Wˆl(j)|
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Figure 2: Application of Algorithm 1 by conditioning of a bit stream by the
generator matrix of the BCH(33, 13, 5) code. Estimates produced with a number
of samples s = 2k−g, where 2k operations would be the brute-force deterministic
method cost. Left: visual representation of the estimated weight distribution
Aˆl obtained with β = −.95.
5 Related work and improvements
For a linear code C, the minimum weight is equivalent to the minimum distance,
d. This is of interest to both coding theorists and cryptographers, and the
algorithms used are of a somewhat affine nature to the one here proposed, so
we briefly discuss the topic - mostly following the summary in [1] and [8]. In
one specific instance [3], the Stern algorithm for the minimum distance [12] was
extended to the estimation of the whole weight distribution of LDPC codes.
In coding theory, the minimum distance d determines the correction capacity
of the code, t = b(d − 1)/2c, and algorithms for finding a specific codeword of
minimum weight can be used to correct a received input x = c + e, for some
x ∈ C with errors of small Hamming weight w(e) ≤ t, by noting that e is the
word of minimum weight in the extended code C′ = C ⊕ x, and c is the unique
closest codeword to x.
In cryptography, the security of code-based ciphers has been reduced, in
whole or in part, to the problem of finding the minimum weight codeword. For
instance, in the McEliece cryptosystem [9] the private key is composed of a
linear [n, k, d] code generator matrix G, an invertible k × k scrambling matrix
S, and n×n permutation matrix P ; the public key is Γ = SGP , which generates
a code with the same [n, k, d] as G; and a ciphertext is computed by encoding
a message m and adding an error vector of weight w(e) ≤ t:
µ = mΓ + e .
The decrypting receiver then computes
µP−1 = mSG+ eP−1 ,
corrects the permuted errors by applying a decoding algorithm, and hence ob-
tains m = (mS)S−1.
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Lee and Brickell observed [6] that the best cryptanalytic attack consisted in
choosing a set I of k random elements of µ, selecting the corresponding columns
of Γ as a k×k matrix ΓI , and computing m˜ = µΓ−1I . If e(I) = 0, this procedure
returns the correct m˜ = m. They also observe that not only is it costly to invert
a random k × k matrix, there is also a cost associated with checking that the
result is correct: if m˜ 6= m, then w(mΓ + m˜Γ) ≥ d. One would therefore also
have to compute w(c+ µ(I)Γ−1I Γ) ≤ t to be able to claim that m˜ = m.
Lee and Brickell further generalized their algorithm to include the possibility
that the random set I includes a small number j of errors. Their original
algorithm can be written as follows:
Algorithm 2 (Lee-Brickell [6]). Given a McEliece public key Γ and a ciphertext
µ = mΓ:
1. Select a k-element indexing set, i (see Remark 1). Compute
Γ′ = Γ(·, i)−1Γ
2. Draw e from E ∼ U ({y ∈ Fk2 |w(y) = j}), at random without replacement;
compute:
m˜ = µ+ µ(i)Γ′ + eΓ′
If at any point w(m˜) < t, return m = m˜. Otherwise, restart with a
different i.
Remark 1 (on indexing). There is no particular need to be prescriptive about
how a k-element indexing is defined. It may be thought of as drawing k times
a uniform random variable without replacement from Zn, though this would
require further specification for subsequent draws; or it can be thought of as
drawing once without replacement from I ∼ U ({x ∈ Fn2 |w(x) = k}), which then
requires a slightly more precise meaning to how this is used as an indexing. Since
it is not critical to this overview of related work, we skip the details.
The Lee-Brickell algorithm, as well as others, can be interpreted in the con-
text of information set decoding, an equivalent definition of which can be given
in terms of the generator matrix or the parity check matrix - see for instance
[1] and [8].
Definition 1 (Information Set). Let I be a k-element indexing of the colmuns
of the parity check matrix H, and denote by HI a column-wise permutation of
H such that
HI = (V |W )I
W = H(·, i)i∈I
V = H(·, j)j /∈I
with H(·, i) the ith column of H.
I is called an information set for the code C if and only if HI = (Z|In−k)I
is a systematic matrix for the code C - with Ik the identity matrix of size k× k.
The complementary set is called a redundancy set.
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From a received message x = c + e, the parity check matrix can be used
to compute the syndrome y = He. The error vector e defines an index set E
of columns of H such that
∑
j∈E H(·, j) = e. The cardinality of this set is
unknown, but as long as #E ≤ t, decoding will succeed. Syndrome decoding is
thus equivalent to finding the set E, so that c = x− 1E .
The Lee-Brickell algorithm can be written as follows (see [8]):
Algorithm 3 (Lee-Brickell - ISD). Let H be a parity check matrix H, Ui ∈ Fn×n2
be a permutation matrix, UG ∈ F(n−k)×(n−k)2 be a Gaussian elimination matrix,
and x be a received message. Suppose we look for errors of a specific weight,
w(e) = η.1
1. Draw a random index set i defining a permutation Ui. If Gaussian elimi-
nation succeeds, we have
(Zi|I) = UG(HUi)
2. Compute the permuted syndrome y = UGHx. Fix a weight j ≤ η. If
w
(
y ⊕
k−1⊕
b=0
Zi(·, b)
)
= η − j
then we can choose another set J of #J = j columns from In−k to obtain
a set I ∪ J of columns of H that sum to y. Otherwise, restart with a
different i.
This algorithm succeeds if the permutation i shifts e exactly so that its first
k entries sum to j, and the remainder to η − j.
Further work [12, 1, 2, 8] makes improvements by more specific assumptions
about the non-zero locations of the error vector, such as a contiguous error-free
region, or by speed-ups of the Gaussian elimination step.
With respect to the Information Set decoding techniques, while Algorithm
1 here proposed attempts to solve a different problem and does not require the
computation of a systematic form of the matrix G, it is interesting to examine
the possibility.
Given a systematic form of G written as (Gs|Ik), and denoting the jth row
of Gs as gj ∈ Fn−k2 , each Y (j) can be written as
Y (j) = B
n−k−1⊕
i=0
gj(i)X(i) (4)
Each X(i) is a Bernoulli random variable B with balance β, and compare
with Eq. (3). Eq. (4) is written to emphasize the fact that the X(i) are the
same for all Y (j), which are clearly correlated, plus a single B independent of
all the others. It would be possible to modify Algorithm 1 to carry out no more
than k(n − k) XOR computations for each sample of Y , though it would still
require drawing n independent random samples of B to compose each X.
1This is especially reasonable in the case of a cryptosystem, where one might set w(e) = t,
as large as possible.
9
6 Conclusion
We have shown an algorithm that is computationally inefficient but demon-
strates an interesting link between the weight distribution of a linear code and
the use of its generator matrix as a compression function. We have shown its
convergence in theory and in a practical example.
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